How not to discard half of the cases in QKD by Pawlowski, Marcin
ar
X
iv
:0
70
8.
09
33
v2
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  2
4 A
ug
 20
07
How not to discard half of the cases in QKD
Marcin Paw lowski
Institute of Theoretical Physics and Astrophysics, Uniwersytet Gdan´ski, PL-80-952, Gdan´sk
Katedra Fizyki Teoretycznej i Informatyki Kwantowej, Politechnika Gdan´ska, PL-80-952, Gdan´sk
(Dated: 13 August 2007)
All known QKD protocols require the parties to discard the results when they have chosen dif-
ferent bases. In this paper we show that it is not necessary. We give examples of QKD protocols
that are as safe as standard ones but do not involve the discarding of the results when the bases
are different or even that do not require the announcement of the bases. This leads to greater
communication channel capacities and render some eavesdropping strategies useless but the most
important thing is that they provide us better insight into the general structures that underlie the
quantum cryptography and help to establish the boundaries of what is possible and what is not.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
All known quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols,
whether entanglement based like Ekert’s [1] or not like
BB84 [2], share one common trait. The communicat-
ing parties choose some measurement bases and later an-
nounce them to find whether or not did they manage to
establish one bit of secret key. In most of the protocols
they can do this in one half of the cases. In the rest of the
protocols this ratio is similar or less [3]. The only excep-
tion is the efficient protocol described in [4]. Though the
parties discard the cases when they have chosen the dif-
ferent bases this happens very rarely due to the fact that
the bases are chosen with different probabilities. This
leads to the similar advantages that protocols described
in this paper have when it comes to communication chan-
nel capacities but, since the bases are still announced by
both parties, does not provide the protocol presented in
[4] with similar advantages when it comes to security is-
sues. Before we present the protocols that do not require
discarding of the cases when the chosen bases are differ-
ent, let us take a look at the QKD from the probability
distribution point of view.
All QKD protocols can be viewed as follows. There is
a joint probability distribution p(a, b, A,B). Each of the
two parties [5] has knowledge of the two of the variables
(Alice knows her choice of the basis a and the measure-
ment outcome or the value of the bit coded A and Bob
knows b and B). The protocols are constructed in such a
way that knowledge of two variables gives nothing, while
the knowledge of three gives the fourth, but not in all
the cases. There are combinations of variables values for
which the fourth one is automatically known and there
are combinations that give no information about it. Later
the parties publicly announce one of their variables a and
b, so now they both have the necessary knowledge of three
variables, while anyone listening to the public channel has
only two. They also know whether this combination of
variables leads to the fourth one (this happens if a = b).
If the bases are randomly chosen, then from the probabil-
ity distribution point of view each variable has the same
status, but in all existing protocols variables denoted by
lower case letters (bases) are preferred. We conjecture
(and prove) that giving equal rights to all variables can
be beneficial to quantum cryptography.
First let our parties reveal A and B (that is the out-
comes) instead of a and b (that is the bases). Let them
do that in the standard BB84 protocol. The outcomes
will be the same in 75% of the cases (always if they have
chosen the same bases and in one half of the cases when
they have chosen different ones), these runs of the proto-
col will be discarded. If the outcomes are different then
they are sure that they have chosen the different bases
and they can use that to generate the bit of the key. Lis-
tening to the public channel gives the third party noth-
ing, since being sure that the bases are different is not
enough, knowledge of a or b is also necessary. This naive
example gives us no benefit when it comes to channel ca-
pacities [6]. On the contrary instead of discarding 50%
of the cases we discard 75%, but it provides us with some
important insight. We see that bases do not have to be
necessarily announced. And since they do not, there may
be no need to discard the cases when they are different.
Before presenting the QKD protocol that does not re-
quire the parties to discard almost anything let us take
a look at a Bell inequality that will provide safety crite-
rion. Let us consider the simplified version of CGLMP
inequality [7] given by Zohren and Gill [8]
Ad(ψ) = P (A2 < B2) + P (B2 < A1)
+P (A1 < B1) + P (B1 ≤ A2) ≥ 1 (1)
Here Xi denotes the measurement outcome of party X in
the basis i. The outcomes can take the value 0,1,..,d− 1.
In [8] it is shown that for quantum probabilities this in-
equality is violated and as the dimensionality of the sys-
tems d rises there are states for which Ad approaches
zero. Surprisingly, these optimal states are not maxi-
mally entangled. For optimal states and huge d’s this
implies that one can find measurement bases for which
P (A2 ≥ B2) ≈ 1, P (A1 ≥ B1) ≈ 1 (2)
P (B2 ≥ B1) ≈ 1, P (B1 > A2) ≈ 1 (3)
Which means that the following is almost always true
B2 ≥ A1 ≥ B1 (4)
B1 > A2 ≥ B2 (5)
2If Alice and Bob announce the measurement outcomes
and discard the cases when they both announce the same
number (which will be a very rare event), they know their
choices of bases. Explicitly, if Alice has the greater num-
ber they both know that they have chosen the base with
the same index (note that A1 is a different base than B1),
if Bob has the greater number they have chosen the bases
with different indexes. It is clear that this phenomenon
can be exploited to create quantum key distribution pro-
tocol.
One of the possibilities for the QKD is:
One subsystem of the state |ψ〉 = ∑d−1i=0 λi|ii〉 (which
λ’s are chosen in such a way that |ψ〉 maximally violates
the inequality (1)) is being send to each party, which
measures it in one of the bases composed of the vectors
|i〉A,a = 1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
exp
(
i
2pi
d
k(i+ αa)
)
|k〉A, (6)
|j〉B,b = 1√
d
d−1∑
l=0
exp
(
i
2pi
d
l(−j + βb)
)
|l〉B, (7)
a, b = 1, 2 is the index of the chosen basis α1 = 0, α2 =
1
2
, β1 =
1
4
and β2 = − 14 . They announce their results
but keep the choices of the bases secret. The only (very
rare) case when they discard the run of the protocol is
when they both announce the same outcome. The choice
of basis of one previously established party (say Alice)
is going to be the key if the eavesdropping check finds
nothing. For this check the parties randomly choose some
runs of the protocol, announce their choices of the bases
and compute the value Ad(ψ). Since |ψ〉 is the optimal
state and the bases are complementary, any measurement
or substitution of another state necessarily leads to Alice
and Bob receiving altered (not optimal) sate for which
the value of Ad(ψ) is greater. If this value differs too
much from the expected the presence of the eavesdropper
is assumed and the protocol is aborted.
This protocol has several advantages. If d is big
enough, almost certainly no cases will be discarded and
this whole step can be omitted. In this case every run
of the experiment generates one bit of the key (if we do
not count some runs needed for the eavesdropping test).
Furthermore if the Alice’s choice of the basis is going to
be the key than it is possible for Bob to send only one
bit to Alice on the public channel while the rest of the
classical communication is done one-way (Alice to Bob),
which can be beneficial in some cases. To do so only Al-
ice announces the outcomes (which further complicates
the job of eavesdropper) of her measurements and Bob
always can find what her base was. Next Alice chooses
randomly some of the cases and sends both variables to
Bob, who computes Ad(ψ) and sends back his only bit,
which carries the information whether the eavesdropper
was present or not.
Unfortunately this protocol has also one serious disad-
vantage. It is highly impractical, since it works fine only
for extremely huge d’s. For small d’s (4) and (5) are not
so often true and when they are the outcomes are usually
equal. The situation gets better as Ad(ψ) goes to zero
but it falls off slower than logarithmically with the di-
mension [8]. The dimensions when it starts to be better
than standard ones are of the order 104, which makes its
physical realization far beyond the scope of the current
technology. Nevertheless, it proves that it is possible to
construct a protocol that does not require any run to be
discarded.
The question arises. It is possible to construct a pro-
tocol that does not require any run to be discarded..
The role of bases and the measurement outcomes can be
swapped. Is it possible to construct a QKD protocol that
involves announcement of the bases but does not require
us to discard anything? The answer again is: yes.
Consider a following protocol:
Alice encodes a random dit in one of the two mutually
unbiased bases, given by vectors (6). That is, if she wants
to encode a dit with value i = 0, 1, .., d−1 in the base a =
1, 2, then she prepares the system in the state |i〉A,a. She
sends it to Bob. For each system received Bob randomly
chooses one of the two modes of operation. The first
mode will be used for the key generation, while the second
one will be used for the eavesdropping detection.
• If Bob chooses the key mode of operation, he ran-
domly chooses one of the bases given by vectors
(7) and makes his measurement. Note that in this
mode Bob always measures system in a different
base than it was prepared. Nevertheless, we will
show that Bob is able to decode the dit of the key
with the probability high enough to make this pro-
tocol effective.
• In the security mode he randomly chooses one of
the bases that Alice could have encoded her dit in
(6) and measures the system.
After all the systems are sent and received Alice an-
nounces her choice of the bases and Bob announces his
choice of the modes. All the cases when Bob had chosen
the security mode are used to check for eavesdropping
in a standard manner. That is, both parties announce
their results and bases. If they chose the same bases
they should get the same outcomes. If this is not the
case, they can assume that they had been eavesdropped.
This mode provides the security against eavesdropping
which works exactly as in the protocol presented in [9].
How does Bob decode the dit when he has measured
the system in a different base that it has been prepared?
It happens that knowing both of the bases and his result
Bob knows that one of the possible letters of the alphabet
is much more probable than the others. The probability
that Bob gets result j, when he had chosen base b and
Alice prepared the state |i〉A,a is
p(a, b, i, j) =
1
d
[
(1− cos ( 2pi
d
(i + j + αa − βb)
) ] (8)
3If a+b < 4 then the most probable outcomes are those
satisfying i+j = 0 mod d. If a = b = 2 then they satisfy
i+ j = −1 mod d.
Note that the structure of (8) assures that we have
only d possible values of p(a, b, i, j) and for each j the set
of possible values is the same regardless of the choice of
a, b and i.
We end up with situation in which no cases are dis-
carded but the structure of the protocol itself introduces
some errors in the key. To answer whether or not this
protocol allows for the faster key generation we need to
look at the channel capacities.
Classically noiseless channel with d-dimensional input
and output alphabets has the capacity log d. When it
comes to QKD, even with perfect quantum channels this
value drops to 1
2
log d. It is due to the fact that the
channels used in cryptography can be viewed as erasure
channels, that is channels that do not change the input
with the probability 1−p and erase it with the probability
p. In standard QKD p = 50% which corresponds to one
half of the cases when Alice and Bob have chosen different
bases and had to discard (erase) their results.
For the sake of clarity let us look at BB84 protocol
from the point of view of information channels. The bit
encoded by Alice in some quantum two-level system is
send to Bob by a channel Ns = N2◦N1. N1 is a quantum
channel which we will assume to be perfect and not deal
with. N2 is a classical erasure channel with the capacity
1
2
. Since N1 is noiseless, Ns also has the capacity of 12 .
For qdits in general this becomes the mentioned 1
2
log d.
If we again assume that the quantum part of the chan-
nel is perfect then the capacity of the channel N2 which
is the same as the capacity of the whole channel N can
be easily computed (see footnote [10])
C(N ) = 2 log d+
2∑
a,b=1
d−1∑
i,j=0
p(a, b, i, j)
4d
log
p(a, b, i, j)
4d
(9)
This capacity is greater than C(Ns) = 12 log d for d > 3
as Fig. 1 shows.
Introducing some noise in the part of the channel N2
does not change anything in the analysis, since it affects
the standard protocols and this one in exactly the same
way.
Note that this protocol can be slightly modified to have
another interesting property. If Bob in the key genera-
tion mode always chooses the base b = 1 he knows that
regardless of Alice’s choice a+b < 4. Then he is sure that
Alice’s and his most probable outcomes satisfy i+ j = 0
mod d so there is no need for Alice to announce her basis.
We end up with a protocol in which nothing is publicly
announced! Unfortunately this modification allows Eve
to introduce less errors by eavesdropping [11], but is true
only when she is using certain strategies. Other strategies
that relay on the knowledge of the announced variables
are not possible at all.
FIG. 1: The ratio of channel capacities for standard QKD and
the ”practical” protocol presented in this paper as a function
of the Hilbert space dimension
We have presented an approach to quantum cryptogra-
phy, in which probability distributions are considered and
each variable (setting or outcome) is treated in the same
fashion. This allows for more flexibility in protocol design
which in turn leads to protocols with higher capacities
and other advantages. For example, note that in both
protocols only one variable (or even none in the modified
practical one) is announced publicly, which can make the
eavesdropper work significantly harder (the eavesdrop-
ping strategies that require the knowledge of the pub-
licly announced data are simply not possible). QKDs
presented in this paper are by no means the end to the
possibilities that arise before quantum cryptography if
we choose to look at it from a different angle.
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